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1. INTRODUCTION
We analyze the classical social choice problem of choosing an alternative from a set of feasible
alternatives based on the preferences of the individuals in a society. Such a procedure is known
as a deterministic social choice function (DSCF). Arrow, Gibbard, and Satterthwaite have identified
some desirable properties of such a DSCF such as unanimity and strategy-proofness. A DSCF is
strategy-proof if a strategic individual cannot change its outcome in her favor by misreporting her
preferences, and it is unanimous if, whenever all the individuals have the same most preferred
alternative, that alternative is chosen. The classic Gibbard (1973)-Satterthwaite (1975) impossibility
theorem states that if there are at least three alternatives and the preferences of the individuals
are unrestricted, then the only DSCFs that are unanimous and strategy-proof are dictatorial. This
assures the presence of an individual, called the dictator, who is such that the DSCF always
chooses her most preferred alternative.
Although unanimity and strategy-proofness are desirable properties of a DSCF, the assumption
of an unrestricted domain made in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem is quite strong. There
are many political and economic scenarios where the preferences of an individual satisfy natural
restrictions such as single-peaked, single-dipped, single-crossing etc. Moreover, the conclusion
of Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem does not apply to such restricted domains. Consequently,
domain restrictions turn out to be an obvious and useful way of evading the dictatorship result in
social choice theory.
Single-peaked property is commonly used in public good location problem. Such domain
restriction occurs in an environment where strictly quasi-concave utility functions are maximized
over a linear budget set. The study of single-peaked domains can be traced back to Black (1948)
where he shows that a Condorcet winner exists on such domains. Later, Moulin (1980) and
Weymark (2011) show that a DSCF on a single-peaked domain is unanimous and strategy-proof if
and only if it is a min-max rule. Single-dipped property is commonly used in public bad location
problem. Peremans and Storcken (1999) show that a DSCF on such a domain is unanimous
and strategy-proof if and only if it is a monotone rule between the left-most and the right-most
alternatives. Single-crossing domains are well-known for their flexibility to accommodate the non-
convexities that appear in case of majority voting.1 Single-crossing domains frequently appear
in models of income taxation and redistribution (Roberts (1977), Meltzer and Richard (1981)),
1See, for example, Romer (1975), p. 181, and Austen-Smith and Banks (2000), pp. 114-115.
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local public goods and stratification (Westhoff (1977), Epple and Platt (1998), Epple et al. (2001)),
and coalition formation (Demange (1994), Kung (2006)).2 Saporiti (2014) shows that a DSCF
on a single-crossing domain is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is an augmented
representative voter scheme. Augmented representative voter schemes are min-max rules where all
the parameters are chosen from the top-set of the domain. Top-set of a domain consists of those
alternatives that appear as a top alternative in some preference in the domain.
Note that well-known restricted domains such as single-peaked, single-dipped, single-crossing
etc. are all based on some prior ordering over the alternatives. In keeping with this, the unanimous
and strategy-proof DSCFs on these domains respect this prior ordering by satisfying a property
known as uncompromisingness. Uncompromisingness ensures that a DSCF is completely deter-
mined by its outcomes at boundary profiles. A boundary profile is one where each individual’s
most preferred alternative is either the maximal or the minimal (w.r.t. the prior ordering) alterna-
tive. Another interesting property that a unanimous and strategy-proof DSCF on these domains
possesses is that it always choses an alternative from the top-set of the domain. For instance, a
unanimous and strategy-proof DSCF on a single-dipped domain chooses either the maximal or
the minimal alternative, and indeed the top-set of this domain consists of those two alternatives.
The same holds for single-crossing domains. This means every DSCF with the aforementioned
properties is a tops-restricted min-max rule. A tops-restricted min-max rule on a domain is a
min-max rule with the property that all its parameters take values belonging to the top-set of the
domain. This raises a general question as to what minimal condition on a domain ensures that
every unanimous and strategy-proof DSCF on that domain is a tops-restricted min-max rule. We
address the random version of this question in this paper.
The boundaries of social choice theory have been expanded by the notion of random social
choice functions (RSCF). An RSCF assigns a probability distribution over the alternatives at every
preference profile. Thus, RSCFs are generalization of DSCFs. The importance of RSCFs over
DSCFs has been well-established in the literature (see, for example, Ehlers et al. (2002), Peters
et al. (2014)).
The study of RSCFs dates back to Gibbard (1977) where he shows that an RSCF on the
unrestricted domain is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is a random dictatorial
2Moreover, models that study the selection of policies in the market for higher education (Epple et al. (2006)) and
the choice of constitutional and voting rules (Barbera and Jackson (2004)), also use single-crossing domains. Saporiti
(2009) has a detailed exposition on various applications, interpretations, and scopes of single-crossing domains.
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rule. A random dictatorial rule is a convex combination of dictatorial rules. Ehlers et al. (2002)
characterize the unanimous and strategy-proof random rules on single-peaked domains, and
Peters et al. (2014) show that such a rule is a convex combination of min-max rules. In a recent
work, Peters et al. (2017) characterize the unanimous and strategy-proof RSCFs on single-dipped
domains and show that they are convex combinations of unanimous and strategy-proof DSCFs
on those domains. However, to the best of our knowledge, the unanimous and strategy-proof
RSCFs on single-crossing domains are not characterized yet.
1.1 OUR CONTRIBUTION
In conformity with the existing literature, stochastic dominance is used to extend preferences
over alternatives to preferences over probability distributions. We identify a condition called top-
richness that is sufficient and almost necessary to ensure that every unanimous and strategy-proof
RSCF is a convex combination of the tops-restricted min-max rules. We demonstrate by way of
example the almost necessity of our condition. Moreover, we show that top-richness is necessary
and sufficient under an additional natural assumption called regularity. A domain is regular if its
top-set contains all alternatives. As an application of our result, we obtain a characterization of
the unanimous and strategy-proof RSCFs on single-peaked, single-dipped, single-crossing, and
some other domains of practical significance.
Although the single-peaked assumption is natural in certain situations, requiring all single-
peaked preferences is quite demanding. In view of this, we look for a characterization of all
regular domains D such that (i) every unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF on Dn is a random
min-max rule, and (ii) every random min-max rule on Dn is strategy-proof. We call such domains
regular random min-max domains. We show that a domain D is regular random min-max if and
only if (i) each preference in D is single-peaked, and (ii) for every two adjacent (w.r.t. the prior
ordering) alternatives, say aj and aj+1, there are two preferences of the form P = ajaj+1 . . . and
P′ = aj+1aj . . . in D.3 Note that the number of preferences in a regular random min-max domain
can range from 2m− 2 to 2m−1, whereas that in the maximal single-peaked domain is 2m−1. Thus,
regular random min-max domains include a large class of restricted single-peaked domains.
We obtain as a bi-product of our result that unanimity and strategy-proofness guarantee
tops-onlyness on top-rich domains. Chatterji and Zeng (2015) provide a sufficient condition for
3By P = ab . . ., we mean a preference P where a is the top and b is the second-top alternatives.
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random tops-only domains, but top-rich domains do not satisfy their condition. Thus, our results
are an exclusion of theirs on tops-onlyness.
Although unanimity implies tops-onlyness under strategy-proofness, tops-onlyness itself is
well-accepted as a desirable property of a social choice function. Moulin (1980) characterizes
the tops-only and strategy-proof DSCFs on single-peaked domains. In a similar attempt, we
characterize the tops-only and strategy-proof RSCFs on top-rich domains. We demonstrate by
way of examples that top-rich domains do not guarantee uncompromisingness for tops-only and
strategy-proof rules, but it is guaranteed if an additional condition called top-connectedness is
imposed on a top-rich domain. Top-connectedness is a commonly used property in social choice
literature which says that for every two adjacent alternatives bj and bj+1 in the top-set, there
are preferences P = bjbj+1 . . . and P′ = bj+1bj . . . that differ only by their top two alternatives.
We provide a complete characterization of the tops-only and strategy-proof RSCFs on top-rich
domains satisfying top-connectedness. Our characterization shows that such an RSCF is a convex
combination of tops-restricted generalized min-max rules and non-top constant rules. A DSCF is
a tops-restricted generalized min-max rule on a domain if it is a generalized min-max rule as
defined in Weymark (2011) with parameters taking values in the top-set of the domain. A DSCF
is a non-top constant rule on a domain if for all profiles, it selects a fixed alternative that is outside
the top-set of the domain.
A domain is said to satisfy deterministic extreme point (DEP) property if every unanimous (tops-
only) and strategy-proof RSCF on the domain is a convex combination of unanimous (tops-only)
and strategy-proof DSCFs on it. The study of such domains is useful as it establishes a functional
relationship between the DSCFs and the RSCFs satisfying unanimity (tops-onlyness) and strategy-
proofness on those domains. Such a relationship can be utilized in finding the optimum RSCFs for
a society. It follows from our result that top-rich domains satisfy DEP property for unanimous
and strategy-proof RSCFs, and top-rich domains satisfying top-connectedness satisfy the same for
tops-only and strategy-proof RSCFs. Gershkov et al. (2013) characterize the optimum DSCFs on
single-crossing domains. It is worth noting that, by means of the DEP property of single-crossing
domains, their result can be translated to RSCFs.
Barbera` et al. (2010) show that strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness are equivalent
for the DSCFs on single-peaked domains and Saporiti (2009) shows the same for the DSCFs on
single-crossing domains. In the same spirit, we show that the same holds for the RSCFs on all the
domains we consider in this paper.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model and basic
definitions. Section 3 presents our main results and Section 4 contains some application of those.
Section 5 provides our results on group-strategy-proofness while Section 6 concludes the paper.
Proofs of lemmas and theorems are gathered in the Appendix.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Let A = {a1, . . . , am} be a finite set of alternatives with a prior ordering a1 ≺ . . . ≺ am.4 Let
N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents. Except where otherwise mentioned, n ≥ 2. For
a, b ∈ A, we define [a, b] = {c | either a  c  b or b  c  a}, and for B ⊆ A, we define
[a, b]B = [a, b] ∩ B.5 A complete, antisymmetric, and transitive binary relation over A (also called
a linear order) is called a preference. We denote by L(A) the set of all preferences over A. For
P ∈ L(A) and a, b ∈ A, aPb is interpreted as ”a is strictly preferred to b according to P”, and
aP!b is interpreted as “a is contiguously ranked above b in P, i.e., aPb and there is there is no
c ∈ A such that aPc and cPb”. For P ∈ L(A), by rk(P) we mean the k-th ranked alternative
in P, i.e., rk(P) = a if and only if |{b ∈ A | bPa}| = k − 1. By Pa, we denote a preference
with r1(Pa) = a, and by Pa,b, we denote a preference with r1(Pa,b) = a and r2(Pa,b) = b. For
convenience, a preference Pa,b is sometimes written as ab . . .. We denote by D ⊆ L(A) a set of
admissible preferences. For a ∈ A, let Da = {P ∈ D | r1(P) = a}. For notational convenience,
whenever it is clear from the context, we do not use braces for singleton sets, i.e., we denote sets
{i} by i. For a domain D, the top-set of D, denoted by τ(D), is defined as τ(D) = ∪P∈Dr1(P).
Whenever we write τ(D) = {b1, . . . , bk}, we assume without loss of generality that the indexation
is such that b1 ≺ . . . ≺ bk. A domain D is called regular if τ(D) = A. For P ∈ D and a ∈ A, the
upper contour set of a at P, denoted by U(a, P), is defined as the set of alternatives that are as good
as a in P, i.e., U(a, P) = {b ∈ A | bPa} ∪ a. A preference profile, denoted by PN = (P1, . . . , Pn), is
an element of Dn = D × . . .×D.
A preference P is called single-peaked if for all a, b ∈ A, [r1(P)  a ≺ b or b ≺ a  r1(P)]
implies aPb. A domain is called single-peaked if each preference in the domain is single-peaked
and is called maximal single-peaked if it contains all single-peaked preferences.
For P ∈ L(A) and B ⊆ A, P|B ∈ L(B) is defined as follows: for all a, b ∈ B, aP|Bb if and
4Whenever we write minimum or maximum of a subset of A, we mean it w.r.t. the ordering ≺ over A.
5By a  b, we mean a = b or a ≺ b.
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only if aPb. For D ⊆ L(A), PN ∈ Dn, and B ⊆ A, we define D|B = {P|B | P ∈ D} and
PN|B = (P1|B, . . . , Pn|B). For B ⊆ A, a domain D of preferences is called a single-peaked domain
restricted to B if D|B is a single-peaked domain.
By4A, we denote the set of probability distributions on A. For two sets X, Y, we define the
symmetric difference of X and Y as XOY = (X \Y) ∪ (Y \ X).
A Random Social Choice Function (RSCF) is a function ϕ : Dn → 4A. For B ⊆ A and PN ∈ Dn,
we define by ϕB(PN) = ∑a∈B ϕa(PN), where ϕa(PN) is the probability of a at ϕ(PN).
REMARK 2.1. For all L, L′ ∈ 4A and all P ∈ L(A), if LU(x,P) ≥ L′U(x,P) and L′U(x,P) ≥ LU(x,P) for
all x ∈ A, then L = L′.
For RSCFs ϕj, j = 1, . . . , k and nonnegative numbers λj, j = 1, . . . , k, summing to 1, we define
the RSCF ϕ = ∑kj=1 ϕ
j by ϕa(PN) = ∑kj=1 λ
jϕ
j
a(PN) for all PN ∈ Dn and all a ∈ A. We call ϕ a
convex combination of the RSCFs ϕj.
Definition 2.1. An RSCF ϕ : Dn → 4A is called unanimous if for all a ∈ A and all PN ∈ Dn,
[r1(Pi) = a for all i ∈ N]⇒ [ϕa(PN) = 1].
Definition 2.2. An RSCF ϕ : Dn → 4A is called strategy-proof if for all i ∈ N, all PN ∈ Dn, all
P′i ∈ D, and all x ∈ A,
∑
y∈U(x,Pi)
ϕy(Pi, P−i) ≥ ∑
y∈U(x,Pi)
ϕy(P′i , P−i).
REMARK 2.2. An RSCF is called a DSCF if it selects a degenerate probability distribution at every
preference profile. More formally, An RSCF ϕ : Dn → 4A is called a DSCF if ϕa(PN) ∈ {0, 1}
for all a ∈ A and all PN ∈ Dn. The notions of unanimity and strategy-proofness for DSCFs are
special cases of the corresponding definitions for RSCFs.
Definition 2.3. Two profiles PN, P′N ∈ Dn are called tops-equivalent if r1(Pi) = r1(P′i ) for all i ∈ N.
Definition 2.4. An RSCF ϕ : Dn → 4A is called tops-only if ϕ(PN) = ϕ(P′N) for all tops-
equivalent PN, P′N ∈ Dn.
Definition 2.5. A DSCF f on Dn is called a generalized tops-restricted min-max (GTM) rule if for all
S ⊆ N, there exists βS ∈ τ(D) satisfying
βT  βS for all S ⊆ T
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such that
f (PN) = min
S⊆N
[
max
i∈S
{r1(Pi), βS}
]
.
A GTM rule on Dn is called a tops-restricted min-max (TM) rule if β∅ = max(τ(D)) and βN =
min(τ(D)). If τ(D) = A, then a GTM rule is called a generalized min-max rule and a TM rule is
called a min-max rule.
Note that GTM rules are not unanimous, whereas TM rules are unanimous.
REMARK 2.3. Let f : Dn → A be a GTM rule. Define fˆ : (D|τ(D))n → τ(D) such that fˆ (PN|τ(D)) =
f (PN). This is well-defined since f is tops-only and f (PN) ∈ τ(D) for all PN ∈ Dn. Then, f is
strategy-proof if and only if fˆ is strategy-proof.
Definition 2.6. An RSCF ϕ : Dn → 4A is called a tops-restricted random min-max (TRM) rule if ϕ
can be written as a convex combination of some TM rules. If τ(D) = A, then a TRM rule is called
a random min-max rule.
Definition 2.7. An RSCF ϕ : Dn → 4A is called uncompromising if ϕB(PN) = ϕB(P′i , P−i) for all
i ∈ N, all PN ∈ Dn, all P′i ∈ D, and all B ⊆ A such that B ∩ [r1(Pi), r1(P′i )] = ∅.
REMARK 2.4. An uncompromising RSCF is tops-only by definition.
Definition 2.8. Let D be a domain with τ(D) = {b1, . . . , bk}. Then, D is called top-rich if
(i) for all bj, bj+1 ∈ τ(D), there exist P = bjbj+1 . . . , P′ = bj+1bj . . . ∈ D such that
U(bl, P)OU(bl, P′) ⊆ τ(D) for all bl ∈ τ(D), and
(ii) for all r < s < t and all Pbr , Pbt ∈ D, U(bs, Pbr) ∩U(bs, Pbt) = bs.
Condition (i) ensures some type of richness of the domain w.r.t. the top-set. It says the
following. Take two alternatives, say bj, bj+1, that are consecutive in the top-set, that is, there is no
other alternative in the top-set that lies in-between (w.r.t. the prior order≺) those two alternatives.
Then, there must be two preferences P = bjbj+1 . . . , P′ = bj+1bj . . . such that for all b ∈ τ(D) and
c /∈ τ(D), bPc if and only if bP′c. Condition (ii) ensures that the domain respects the prior order≺
over the alternatives in a suitable sense. For instance, as we show in Lemma A.1, one implication
of this condition is that a top-rich domain restricted to its top-set is single-peaked. However,
Condition (ii) is stronger than implying that the domain restricted to its top-set is single-peaked
as it puts some restrictions on the ranking of the alternatives outside the top-set.
Below, we provide an example of a top-rich domain.
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Example 2.1. Let the set of alternatives be A = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5} with prior order a1 ≺ . . . ≺ a5.
Consider the domain D = {P1, . . . , P7} given in Table 1.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7
a1 a1 a3 a3 a3 a5 a5
a2 a3 a1 a1 a5 a3 a4
a3 a2 a2 a4 a1 a1 a3
a4 a4 a4 a2 a2 a2 a2
a5 a5 a5 a5 a4 a4 a1
Table 1
Note that τ(D) = {b1, b2, b3}, where b1 = a1, b2 = a3, and b3 = a5. We show that D is a
top-rich domain, in particular, we show that it satisfies Conditions (i) and (ii) in Definition 2.8.
For Condition (i), consider, for instance, b1 and b2. Take P = P2 = a1a3 . . . and P′ = P4 =
a3a1 . . .. Then, rl(P) = rl(P′) for all l ≥ 3, and hence U(x, P)OU(x, P′) = ∅ for all x ∈ τ(D) \
{b1, b2}. So, Condition (i) is satisfied for b1 and b2. Similarly, Condition (i) can be verified for b2
and b3.
For Condition (ii), consider r = 1, s = 2, t = 3, and preferences Pb1 = P1 and Pb3 = P5. Then,
U(b2, Pb1) = {a1, a2, a3} and U(b2, Pb3) = {a3, a4, a5}. Therefore, U(b2, Pb1) ∩U(b2, Pb3) = {b2},
as required by Condition (ii). Similarly, Condition (ii) can be verified for other cases.
3. RESULTS
3.1 STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND UNANIMITY
In this subsection, we present our main result characterizing the unanimous and strategy-proof
RSCFs on top-rich domains.
In the following theorem, we show that a unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF on a top-rich
domain never assigns a positive probability to an alternative outside the top-set, and such an
RSCF is uncompromising.
Theorem 3.1. Let D be a top-rich domain and let ϕ : Dn → 4A be a unanimous and strategy-proof
RSCF. Then,
(i) ϕτ(D)(PN) = 1 for all PN ∈ Dn, and
(ii) ϕ is uncompromising.
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The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix A.
Our next theorem provides a characterization of the unanimous and strategy-proof RSCFs on
top-rich domains.
Theorem 3.2. Let D be a top-rich domain and let ϕ : Dn → 4A be an RSCF. Then, ϕ is unanimous and
strategy-proof if and only if it is a TRM rule.
The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix B.
3.1.1 TOP-CONNECTED TRM DOMAINS
In this section, we provide a characterization of the domains on which (i) every TRM rule is
strategy-proof, and (ii) every unanimous and strategy-proof rule is a TRM rule. For tractability
and transparency, we restrict our attention to the top-connected domains. We call such domains
top-connected TRM domains. Below, we provide a formal definition of such domains.
Definition 3.1. Two preferences P, P′ ∈ D are called top-connected, denoted by P∼P′, if r1(P) =
r2(P′), r1(P′) = r2(P), and rl(P) = rl(P′) for all l ≥ 3.
Definition 3.2. A domain D with τ(D) = {b1, . . . , bk} satisfies the top-connectedness property if
for all j = 1, . . . , k− 1, there exist P ∈ Dbj , P′ ∈ Dbj+1 such that P∼P′.
Definition 3.3. A domain D is called a TRM domain if
(i) every TRM rule on Dn is strategy-proof, and
(ii) every unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF on Dn is a TRM rule.
Furthermore, a domain is called a top-connected TRM domain if it is a TRM domain and it
satisfies top-connectedness.
In the following, we establish a crucial property of TRM domains.
Lemma 3.1. Let D be a TRM domain. Then, D|τ(D) is a single-peaked domain.
Proof. Let τ(D) = {b1, . . . , bk}. Assume for contradiction that there exists Q ∈ D such that Q|τ(D)
is not single-peaked. Without loss of generality, this means there exist br, bs with br ≺ bs ≺ r1(Q)
such that brQbs. Consider the tops-restricted min-max rule f on Dn such that βS = br for all
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non-empty S ( N. Consider the profile PN ∈ Dn such that P1 = Q and r1(Pi) = bs for all i 6= 1.
Then, by the definition of f , f (PN) = bs. Let P′1 ∈ D be such that r1(P′1) = br. Again, by the
definition of f , f (P′1, P−1) = br. Because brQbs, this means agent 1 manipulates at PN via P
′
1,
which is a contradiction. 
Our next theorem provides a characterization of top-connected TRM domains.
Theorem 3.3. A domainD is a top-connected TRM domain if and only if it is a top-rich domain satisfying
top-connectedness.
The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix C.
3.2 STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND TOPS-ONLYNESS
In this subsection, we replace unanimity by tops-onlyness and characterize the tops-only and
strategy-proof RSCFs on top-rich domains. First, we introduce the notion of a non-top constant
rule that we use in our characterization.
Definition 3.4. A DSCF f : Dn → A is called a non-top constant rule if there exists c ∈ A \ τ(D)
such that f (PN) = c for all PN ∈ Dn.
The following example shows that tops-only and strategy-proof on top-rich domains is not
necessarily uncompromising.
Example 3.1. Let the set of alternatives be A = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5} with prior order a1 ≺ . . . ≺ a5.
Consider the domain D = {a1a2a3a4a5, a2a1a4a3a5, a2a5a1a4a3, a5a2a1a3a4}. It is easy to see that
D is a top-rich domain with τ(D) = {a1, a2, a5}. Consider the RSCF, say ϕ, given in Table 2. It
can be verified that ϕ is tops-only and strategy-proof . We show ϕ is not uncompromising. Con-
sider the outcomes ϕ(a1a2a3a4a5, a1a2a3a4a5) = (.3, .2, .2, .1, .2) and ϕ(a1a2a3a4a5, a2a1a4a3a5) =
(.2, .3, .1, .2, .2). Here, agent 2 changes his top from a1 to a2, but the probabilities of a3 and a4 are
changed. Hence, ϕ is not uncompromising.
In view of Example 3.1, we look for an additional condition on top-rich domains to ensure
uncompromisingness for the tops-only and strategy-proof RSCFs. We show in our next theorem
that top-connectedness is one such condition. More formally, we show that if a top-rich domain
satisfies top-connectedness, then every tops-only and strategy-proof RSCF defined on it is un-
compromising. We further show that such a rule assigns a fixed probability to the top-set of the
domain.
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1 2 a1a2a3a4a5 a2a1a4a3a5 a2a5a1a4a3 a5a2a1a3a4
a1a2a3a4a5 (.3, .2, .2, .1, .2) (.2, .3, .1, .2, .2) (.2, .3, .1, .2, .2) (.2, .2, .2, .1, .3)
a2a1a4a3a5 (.3, .2, .2, .1, .2) (.2, .3, .1, .2, .2) (.2, .3, .1, .2, .2) (.2, .2, .1, .2, .3)
a2a5a1a4a3 (.3, .2, .2, .1, .2) (.2, .3, .1, .2, .2) (.2, .3, .1, .2, .2) (.2, .2, .1, .2, .3)
a5a2a1a3a4 (.3, .2, .2, .1, .2) (.2, .3, .1, .2, .2) (.2, .3, .1, .2, .2) (.2, .2, .1, .2, .3)
Table 2
Theorem 3.4. Let D be a top-rich domain satisfying top-connectedness and let ϕ : Dn → 4A be a
tops-only and strategy-proof RSCF. Then,
(i) ϕ is uncompromising,
(ii) there exists 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 such that ϕτ(D)(PN) = α for all PN ∈ Dn, and
(iii) ϕc(PN) = ϕc(P′N) for all PN, P
′
N ∈ Dn and all c ∈ A \ τ(D).
The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix D.
Now, we provide a characterization of the tops-only and strategy-proof RSCFs on top-rich
domains satisfying top-connectedness.
Theorem 3.5. Let D be a top-rich domain satisfying top-connectedness and let ϕ : Dn → 4A be an
RSCF. Then, ϕ is tops-only and strategy-proof if and only if it is a convex combination of GTM rules and
non-top constant rules.
The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix E.
4. APPLICATION
In this section, we demonstrate the applicability of our results in characterizing the unanimous
and strategy-proof random rules on some well-known domains.
4.1 SINGLE-PEAKED DOMAINS
As discussed earlier, many domains of practical importance satisfy single-peakedness property.
Ehlers et al. (2002) characterize the unanimous and strategy-proof RSCFs on maximal single-
peaked domains as fixed-probabilistic-ballots rules, and Peters et al. (2014) show that such an
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RSCF is a convex combination of min-max rules. In what follows, we characterize all single-
peaked domains where every unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF is a convex combination of
min-max rules. We call such domains regular random min-max domains.
4.1.1 REGULAR RANDOM MIN-MAX DOMAINS
We begin with the formal definition of regular random min-max domains.
Definition 4.1. A domain D is called a regular random min-max domain if
(i) D is regular,
(ii) every random min-max rule on Dn is strategy-proof, and
(iii) every unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF on Dn is a random min-max rule.
Now, we introduce the notion of a weakly top-connected single peaked domain. Two pref-
erences P, P′ ∈ D are called weakly top-connected if P = ab . . . and P′ = ba . . . for some a, b ∈ A.
Note that P and P′ might have different orderings over the alternatives other than their top two
alternatives.
Definition 4.2. A domain D is called a weakly top-connected single peaked domain if D is a single-
peaked domain and for all 1 ≤ j < m, there exist P ∈ Daj , P′ ∈ Daj+1 such that P and P′ are
weakly top-connected.
REMARK 4.1. A weakly top-connected single-peaked domain trivially satisfies Condition (i) in
Definition 2.8.
Our next theorem provides a characterization of regular random min-max domains.
Theorem 4.1. A domain is a regular random min-max domain if and only if it is a weakly top-connected
single-peaked domain.
Proof. (If Part) Let D be a weakly top-connected single-peaked domain. We show that D is a
regular random min-max domain. By Remark 4.1, D satisfies Condition (i) in Definition 2.8.
Moreover, since D is single-peaked, Condition (ii) in Definition 2.8 is also satisfied. Therefore, D
is a top-rich domain with τ(D) = A. So, by Theorem 3.2, D is a regular random min-max domain.
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(Only-if Part) Let D be a regular random min-max domain. Then, by definition, D is a TRM
domain with τ(D) = A. Therefore, by Lemma 3.1, D is single-peaked. We show D is weakly
top-connected. Assume for contradiction that for some j < m, there do not exist P, P′ ∈ D such
that P = ajaj+1 . . . and P′ = aj+1aj . . .. Without loss of generality, assume that r2(P) 6= aj+1 for all
P ∈ Daj . Since D is single-peaked, this means j 6= 1 and r2(P) = aj−1 for all P ∈ Daj . Consider
the DSCF f on Dn as follows:6
f (PN) =

r1(P1) if r1(P1) 6= aj,
aj if r1(P1) = aj and ajP2aj−1,
aj−1 otherwise.
It can be verified that f is unanimous and strategy-proof. We show that f is not a min-max
rule. In particular, we show that f is not uncompromising. This is sufficient as every min-max
rule is uncompromising. Let PN ∈ Dn be such that r1(P2) = a1. Then, by the definition of f ,
f (PN) = aj−1 when r1(P1) = aj, and f (P′1, P−1) = aj+1 when r1(P
′
1) = aj+1. This clearly violates
uncompromisingness for agent 1. This completes the proof of the only-if part. 
4.1.2 STRATEGY-PROOF AND TOPS-ONLY RANDOM RULES
In this subsection, we provide a characterization of the tops-only and strategy-proof RSCFs on
top-connected single-peaked domains. First, we show by means of an example that weakly
top-connected single-peaked domains do not guarantee uncompromisingness for the tops-only
and strategy-proof RSCFs on those domains.
Example 4.1. Let the set of alternatives be A = {a1, a2, a3, a4} with prior order a1 ≺ . . . ≺ a4.
Consider the domain D = {a1a2a3a4, a2a1a3a4, a2a3a1a4, a3a2a4a1, a3a4a2a1, a4a3a2a1}. It can be
easily verified that D is a weakly top-connected single-peaked domain. Consider the RSCF, say
ϕ, given in Table 3. It is left to the reader to verify that ϕ is tops-only and strategy-proof . We
show that ϕ is not uncompromising. Consider the outcomes ϕ(a1a2a3a4, a2a3a1a4) = (.3, .3, .2, .2)
and ϕ(a1a2a3a4, a3a2a4a1) = (.2, .2, .3, .3). Here, agent 2 changes his top from a2 to a3, but the
probabilities of a1 and a4 are changed. Hence, ϕ is not uncompromising.
In view of Example 4.1, we strengthen weak top-connectedness by requiring top-connectedness.
6Here D satisfies the unique seconds property defined in Aswal et al. (2003) and the SCF f considered here is
similar to the one used in the proof of Theorem 5.1 in Aswal et al. (2003).
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1 2 a1a2a3a4 a2a1a3a4 a2a3a1a4 a3a2a4a1 a3a4a2a1 a4a3a2a1
a1a2a3a4 (.3, .3, .2, .2) (.3, .3, .2, .2) (.3, .3, .2, .2) (.2, .2, .3, .3) (.2, .2, .3, .3) (.2, .2, .3, .3)
a2a1a3a4 (.3, .3, .2, .2) (.3, .3, .2, .2) (.3, .3, .2, .2) (.2, .2, .3, .3) (.2, .2, .3, .3) (.2, .2, .3, .3)
a2a3a1a4 (.3, .3, .2, .2) (.3, .3, .2, .2) (.3, .3, .2, .2) (.2, .2, .3, .3) (.2, .2, .3, .3) (.2, .2, .3, .3)
a3a2a4a1 (.3, .3, .2, .2) (.3, .3, .2, .2) (.3, .3, .2, .2) (.2, .2, .3, .3) (.2, .2, .3, .3) (.2, .2, .3, .3)
a3a4a2a1 (.3, .3, .2, .2) (.3, .3, .2, .2) (.3, .3, .2, .2) (.2, .2, .3, .3) (.2, .2, .3, .3) (.2, .2, .3, .3)
a4a3a2a1 (.3, .3, .2, .2) (.3, .3, .2, .2) (.3, .3, .2, .2) (.2, .2, .3, .3) (.2, .2, .3, .3) (.2, .2, .3, .3)
Table 3
Clearly, a top-connected single-peaked domain is a top-rich domain satisfying top-connectedness.
Moreover, such a domain is regular by definition. Therefore, there does not exist any non-top
constant rule on such domains. This yields the following corollary.
Corollary 4.1. Let D be a top-connected single-peaked domain and let ϕ : Dn → 4A be an RSCF. Then,
ϕ is tops-only and strategy-proof if and only if it is a convex combination of generalized min-max rules.
4.2 SINGLE-CROSSING DOMAINS
In this subsection, we introduce the notion of single-crossing domains and provide a characteriza-
tion of the unanimous (tops-only) and strategy-proof RSCFs on these domains.
Definition 4.3. A domain D is called a single-crossing domain w.r.t. an ordering < over D if for all
a, b ∈ A and all P, P′ ∈ D,
[a ≺ b, P < P′, and bPa] =⇒ bP′a.
A domain is called single-crossing if it is single-crossing w.r.t. some ordering over the domain.
Definition 4.4. A single-crossing domain D¯ is called maximal if there does not exist a single-
crossing domain D such that D¯ ( D.
REMARK 4.2. A maximal single-crossing domain with m alternatives contains m(m− 1)/2+ 1
preferences.7
Definition 4.5. A domain D is called a successive single-crossing domain if there is a maximal
single-crossing domain D¯ w.r.t. some ordering <, and P′, P′′ ∈ D¯ with P′ ≤ P′′ such that
D = {P ∈ D¯ | P′ ≤ P ≤ P′′}.
7For details see Saporiti (2009).
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The notion of a successive single-crossing domain is introduced in Carroll (2012). In the
following example, we present a maximal single-crossing domain and a successive single-crossing
domain with 5 alternatives.
Example 4.2. Let the set of alternatives be A = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5} with prior order a1 ≺ . . . ≺ a5.
Consider the domain D¯ = {a1a2a3a4a5, a2a1a3a4a5, a2a3a1a4a5, a2a3a4a1a5, a2a4a3a1a5, a4a2a3a1a5,
a4a2a3a5a1, a4a3a2a5a1, a4a3a5a2a1, a4a5a3a2a1, a5a4a3a2a1}. Then, D¯ is a maximal single-crossing
domain w.r.t. the ordering< over D¯ given by a1a2a3a4a5 < a2a1a3a4a5 < a2a3a1a4a5 < a2a3a4a1a5 <
a2a4a3a1a5 < a4a2a3a1a5 < a4a2a3a5a1 < a4a3a2a5a1 < a4a3a5a2a1 < a4a5a3a2a1 < a5a4a3a2a1.
Note that the cardinality of A is 5 and that of D¯ is 5(5− 1)/2+ 1 = 11. Now, consider the domain
D = {a1a2a3a4a5, a2a1a3a4a5, a2a3a1a4a5, a2a3a4a1a5}. Then, D is a successive single-crossing
domain.
Our next lemma shows that every successive single-crossing domain is a top-rich domain
satisfying top-connectedness.
Lemma 4.1. Let D be a successive single-crossing domain. Then, D is a top-rich domain satisfying
top-connectedness.
Proof. Let D be a successive single-crossing domain. Then, by the definition of successive single-
crossing domain, there is a a maximal single-crossing domain D¯ w.r.t. some ordering < such
that D = {P ∈ D¯ | P˜ ≤ P ≤ ˜˜P} for some P˜, ˜˜P ∈ D¯ with P˜ ≤ ˜˜P. Suppose τ(D) = {b1, . . . , bk}.
We show that for all j = 1, 2, . . . , k− 1, there are P ∈ Dbj and P′ ∈ Dbj+1 such that P ∼ P′. Take
bj, bj+1 ∈ τ(D) and take P¯ ∈ Dbj and Pˆ ∈ Dbj+1 . Since bjP¯bj+1, bj+1Pˆbj, and bj ≺ bj+1, it follows
from the definition of single-crossing domain that P¯ < Pˆ. Using a similar argument, Pbl < P¯
for all l < j, and Pbl > Pˆ for all l > j + 1. Therefore, there must be P ∈ Dbj and P′ ∈ Dbj+1 that
are consecutive in the ordering < meaning that there is no P′′ ∈ D with P < P′′ < P′. We show
P ∼ P′. Suppose not. Let a be the alternative such that aP!bj+1. Consider the preference P′′ that
is obtained by switching the alternatives a and bj+1 in P, i.e., P′′OP = {(a, bj+1), (bj+1, a)}. We
show P′′ /∈ D¯. In particular, we show that P′′ 6< P and P′ 6< P′′. This is sufficient since P and P′
are consecutive in the ordering <. Suppose P′′ < P. Since aPbj+1, P < P′, and bj+1P′a, by the
single-crossing property of D¯, it must be that a ≺ bj+1. However, because bj+1P′′a and aPbj+1,
this contradicts P′′ < P. Now, suppose P′ < P′′. Since P < P′, there must be a pair of alternatives
c, d with c ≺ d such that cPd and dP′c. Moreover, because P and P′ are not top-connected, it must
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be that {c, d} 6= {a, bj+l}. Since c ≺ d, dP′c, and P′ < P′′, by the single-crossing property of D¯,
we have dP′′c. However, by the construction of P′′, we have cP′′d, a contradiction. Thus, we
have P′′ /∈ D¯. However, this means D¯ ∪ P′′ is a single-crossing domain w.r.t. the ordering <′
over D¯ ∪ P′′, where <′ is obtained by placing P′′ in-between P and P′ in the ordering <, i.e., <′
coincides with < over D¯ and P <′ P′′ <′ P′. This contradicts that D¯ is a maximal single-crossing
domain. Therefore, P ∼ P′.
Now, we show that U(bs, Pbr) ∩ U(bs, Pbt) = {bs} for all r < s < t and all Pbr , Pbt ∈ D.
Assume for contradiction that a ∈ U(bs, Pbr) ∩U(bs, Pbt) for some a 6= bs. Take Pbs ∈ D. Using
a similar argument as before, we have Pbr < Pbs < Pbt . Because a ∈ U(bs, Pbr) ∩U(bs, Pbt), we
have aPbr bs, bsPbs a, and aPbt bs. Now, if a ≺ bs, then by the single-crossing property of D, bsPbs a
and Pbs < Pbt together imply bsPbt a, a contradiction. On the other hand, if bs ≺ a, then by the
single-crossing property of D, aPbr bs and Pbr < Pbs together imply aPbs bs, a contradiction. This
completes the proof. 
Our next two corollaries characterize the unanimous (tops-only) and strategy-proof RSCFs on
successive single-crossing domains. Note that if a domain D satisfies Condition (ii) in Definition
2.8, then any subdomain (i.e., subset) of D also satisfies the same. Moreover, if a domain satisfies
top-connectedness, then it satisfies Condition (i) in Definition 2.8.
Corollary 4.2. Let D be a subset of a successive single-crossing domain satisfying Condition (i) in
Definition 2.8 and let ϕ : Dn → 4A be an RSCF. Then, ϕ is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if
it is a TRM rule.
Corollary 4.3. Let D be a subset of successive single-crossing domain satisfying top-connectedness and
let ϕ : Dn → 4A be an RSCF. Then, ϕ is tops-only and strategy-proof if and only if it is a convex
combination of GTM and non-top constant rules.
4.3 SINGLE-DIPPED DOMAINS
In this subsection, we introduce the notion of single-dipped domains and present a characteriza-
tion of the unanimous (tops-only) and strategy-proof RSCFs on these domains. We begin with
the formal definition of single-dipped domains.
Definition 4.6. A preference P is called single-dipped if P has a unique minimal element d(P), the
dip of P, such that for all a, b ∈ A, [d(P)  a ≺ b or b ≺ a  d(P)]⇒ bPa. A domain is called
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single-dipped if each preference in it is single-dipped.
A single-dipped domain vacuously satisfies Condition (ii) in Definition 2.8. Therefore, a
single-dipped domain satisfying Condition (i) in Definition 2.8 is a top-rich domain. This yields
the following two corollaries.
Corollary 4.4. Let D be a single-dipped domain satisfying Condition (i) in Definition 2.8 and let ϕ :
Dn → 4A be an RSCF. Then, ϕ is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is a TRM rule.
Corollary 4.5. Let D be a single-dipped domain satisfying top-connectedness and let ϕ : Dn → 4A be
an RSCF. Then, ϕ is tops-only and strategy-proof if and only if it is a convex combination of GTM and
non-top constant rules.
4.4 BINARY-RESTRICTED DOMAINS
The notion of binary-restricted domains is introduced in Peters et al. (2017). However, their notion
is based on weak preferences, i.e., preferences with indifferences. For the sake of completeness,
we present below the definition of binary-restricted domains for strict preferences.
Definition 4.7. A domain D is called a stricly binary-restricted domain if |τ(D)| = 2.
The following corollaries are an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.5.
Corollary 4.6. Let D be a strictly binary-restricted domain satisfying Condition (i) in Definition 2.8 and
let ϕ : Dn → 4A be an RSCF. Then, ϕ is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is a TRM rule.
Corollary 4.7. LetD be a strictly binary-restricted domain satisfying top-connectedness and let ϕ : Dn →
4A be an RSCF. Then, ϕ is tops-only and strategy-proof if and only if it is a convex combination of GTM
and non-top constant rules.
4.5 OTHER DOMAINS
In this subsection, we present a class of top-rich domains that are neither single-peaked nor
single-dipped nor single-crossing domains. In order to illustrate the practical significance of
such domains, let us consider a public good location problem of the following type. Suppose
that there are ten available locations b1, . . . , b5, c1, . . . , c5 to locate a public good amongst which
only b1, . . . , b5 are the residential areas. Assume that the agents base their preferences over the
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locations on some type of distances (geometric/traffic or so). Suppose further that the ties are
broken on both sides. Naturally, the top-alternative in any such preference can only be one of
the locations b1, . . . , b5. Figure 1 presents the communication graph together with the distances
between the locations, and Table 4 presents the domain that is based on the graph in Figure 1.
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
2.5
2.7
2.3
2.9
3.3
2 2 2 2
Figure 1
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
b1 b2 b2 b3 b3 b4 b4 b5
b2 b1 b3 b2 b4 b3 b5 b4
c1 c1 c2 c2 c3 c3 c4 c4
c2 c2 c3 c3 c2 c2 c5 c5
c3 c3 c1 c1 c4 c4 b3 b3
b3 b3 b1 b1 b2 b2 c3 c3
b4 b4 b4 b4 b5 b5 c2 c2
c4 c4 c4 c4 c1 c1 b2 b2
c5 c5 c5 c5 c5 c5 c1 c1
b5 b5 b5 b5 b1 b1 b1 b1
Table 4
It is fairly straightforward to verify that the domain in Table 4 is a top-rich domain satisfying
top-connectedness. This yields the following corollaries.
Corollary 4.8. Let D be the domain in Table 4 and let ϕ : Dn → 4A be an RSCF. Then, ϕ is unanimous
and strategy-proof if and only if it is a TRM rule.
Corollary 4.9. Let D be the domain in Table 4 and let ϕ : Dn → 4A be an RSCF. Then, ϕ is tops-only
and strategy-proof if and only if it is a convex combination of GTM and non-top constant rules.
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4.6 DETERMINISTIC EXTREME POINT PROPERTY
In this subsection, we introduce the notion of deterministic extreme point property and show that
top-rich domains satisfy this property.
Definition 4.8. A domain D is said to satisfy deterministic extreme point property for unanimous
(tops-only) and strategy-proof RSCFs if every unanimous (tops-only) and strategy-proof RSCF on
Dn can be written as a convex combination of unanimous (tops-only) and strategy-proof DSCFs
on Dn.
The following two corollaries are obtained from Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.4.
Corollary 4.10. Top-rich domains satisfy deterministic extreme point property for unanimous and strategy-
proof RSCFs.
Corollary 4.11. Top-rich domains satisfying top-connectedness satisfy deterministic extreme point prop-
erty for tops-only and strategy-proof RSCFs.
5. GROUP STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
In this section, we consider group strategy-proofness and provide a characterization of the
unanimous (tops-only) and group strategy-proof RSCFs on top-rich domains. We begin with the
formal definition of group strategy-proofness.
Definition 5.1. An RSCF ϕ : Dn → 4A is group strategy-proof if for all non-empty coalitions
C ⊆ N, all PN ∈ Dn, and all P′C ∈ D|C|, there is i ∈ C such that for all x ∈ A
∑
y∈U(x,Pi)
ϕy(PN) ≥ ∑
y∈U(x,Pi)
ϕy(P′C, P−C).
Group strategy-proofness implies that, whenever a non-empty coalition of agents misreport
their preferences, there is an agent in that coalition who does not strictly benefit from the misrep-
resentation.
REMARK 5.1. A convex combination of some unanimous (tops-only) and group strategy-proof
DSCFs is a unanimous (tops-only) and group strategy-proof RSCF.
Theorem 5.1. Let D be a top-rich domain. Then, an RSCF ϕ : Dn → 4A is unanimous and group
strategy-proof if and only if it is a TRM rule.
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Proof. (If Part) A TRM rule is unanimous by definition. Therefore, in view of Remark 5.1, it
is sufficient to show that each TM rule is group strategy-proof. Let f be a TM rule. Define
f ′ : (D|τ(D))n → A such that f ′(PN|τ(D)) = f (PN). By Remark 2.3, f ′ is well-defined. Because
D|τ(D) is single-peaked and f ′ is a min-max rule on (D|τ(D))n, it follows from Barbera` et al. (2010)
that f ′ is group strategy-proof. By the definition of f ′, this implies f is group strategy-proof. This
completes the if part of the proof.
(Only-if Part) Since every group strategy-proof RSCF is strategy-proof, the proof of this part
follows from Theorem 3.2. 
Theorem 5.2. Let D be a top-rich domain satisfying top-connectedness. Then, an RSCF ϕ : Dn → 4A
is tops-only and group strategy-proof if and only if it is a convex combination of GTM rules and non-top
constant rules.
Proof. (If Part) Since GTM rules and non-top constant rules are all tops-only, a convex combination
of those is also tops-only. Moreover, non-top constant rules are clearly group strategy-proof.
Therefore, in view of Remark 5.1, it is sufficient to show that each GTM rule is group strategy-
proof. Let f be a GTM rule. Define f ′ : (D|τ(D))n → A as in the proof of Theorem 5.1. Since f is a
GTM rule, f ′ is a generalized min-max rule. Moreover, because D|τ(D) is single-peaked and f ′
is a generalized min-max rule on (D|τ(D))n, it follows from Barbera` et al. (2010) that f ′ is group
strategy-proof.8 By the definition of f ′, this implies f is group strategy-proof. This completes the
if part of the proof.
(Only-if Part) Since every group strategy-proof RSCF is strategy-proof, the proof of this part
follows from Theorem 3.5. 
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown that an RSCF on a top-rich domain is unanimous and strategy-proof
if and only if it can be written as a convex combination of tops-restricted min-max rules. We have
also provided a characterization of all domains where an RSCF is unanimous and strategy-proof
if and only if it is a random min-max rule. Further, we have characterized the tops-only and
strategy-proof RSCFs on top-rich domains satisfying the top-connectedness property. Finally, we
8Actually, Barbera` et al. (2010) show that every min-max rule is group strategy-proof on the maximal single-
peaked domain. However, employing the same set of arguments, one can show that generalized min-max rules are
also group strategy-proof on the maximal single-peaked domains.
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establish the equivalence of strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness on all the domains
we consider in this paper.
A. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
We present the proof of Theorem 3.1 in this section. First, we prove two lemmas that we use in
our proof. The following lemma establishes a crucial property of the top-rich domains.
Lemma A.1. Let D be a top-rich domain. Then, D|τ(D) is single-peaked.
Proof. Let D be a top-rich domain with τ(D) = {b1, . . . , bk}. We show that D|τ(D) is single-
peaked. Without loss of generality, assume for contradiction that there exists P ∈ D such that
r1(P) = bj and bl′Pbl for some l, l′ with l′ < l < j. Take P′ ∈ Dbl′ . Then, bl′ ⊆ U(bl, P) ∩U(bl, P′),
which is a contradiction to Condition (ii) in Definition 2.8. This completes the proof. 
In the following, we prove a technical lemma that we use repeatedly in the proof of Theorem
3.1.
Lemma A.2. Let D be a domain and let ϕ : Dn → 4A be a unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF. Let
PN ∈ Dn, P′i ∈ D, and B ⊆ A be such that Pi|B = P′i |B and ϕa(PN) = ϕa(P′i , P−i) for all a /∈ B. Then,
ϕ(PN) = ϕ(P′i , P−i).
Proof. Suppose not. Let b ∈ B be such that ϕb(PN) 6= ϕb(P′i , P−i) and ϕa(PN) = ϕa(P′i , P−i) for
all a ∈ B with aPib. In other words, b is the maximal element of B according to Pi that violates
the assertion of the lemma. Without loss of generality, assume that ϕb(PN) < ϕb(P′i , P−i). Since
ϕc(PN) = ϕc(P′i , P−i) for all c ∈ U(b, Pi) \ b, this means ϕU(b,Pi)(PN) < ϕU(b,Pi)(P′i , P−i). Hence,
agent i manipulates at PN via P′i , which is a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1
SKETCH OF THE PROOF. We prove the theorem by using the method of induction. We start with
the base case n = 1. The theorem follows trivially for this case. Assuming that the theorem holds
for all sets with k < n agents, we proceed to prove it for n agents. First, we consider the set of
profiles Dˆn = {PN ∈ Dn | P1 = P2} where agents 1 and 2 have the same preference. Since the
restriction of ϕ to Dˆn induces a unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF on Dn−1, by the induction
hypothesis, we claim that the theorem holds for the restriction of ϕ to Dˆn, i.e., ϕτ(D)(PN) = 1 for
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all PN ∈ Dˆn and ϕ restricted to Dˆn is uncompromising (in a suitable sense). Next, we show that
the same holds for the profiles where agents 1 and 2 have the same top alternative. Finally, in
order to prove the theorem for profiles where agents 1 and 2 have arbitrary top alternatives, we
use another level of induction on the ‘distance’ between the top alternatives of agents 1 and 2.
The distance between two alternatives bj+l, bj ∈ τ(D) is defined as l. Assuming that the theorem
holds for profiles where the distance between the top alternatives of agents 1 and 2 is less than l,
we prove it for the profiles where the said distance is l. By induction, this completes the proof of
the theorem.
Proof. We prove the theorem by using induction on the number of agents. Let D be a top-rich
domain with τ(D) = {b1, . . . , bk}.
Let |N| = 1 and let ϕ : D → 4A be a unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF. Then, by unanimity,
ϕτ(D)(PN) = 1 for all PN ∈ D, and hence ϕ satisfies uncompromisingness.
Assume that the theorem holds for all sets with k < n agents. We prove it for n agents. Let
|N| = n and let ϕ : Dn → 4A be a unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF. Suppose N∗ = N \ {1}.
Define the RSCF g : Dn−1 → 4A for the set of voters N∗ as follows: for all PN∗ = (P2, P3, . . . ,
Pn) ∈ Dn−1,
g(P2, P3, . . . , Pn) = ϕ(P2, P2, P3, P4, . . . , Pn).
Evidently, g is a well-defined RSCF satisfying unanimity and strategy-proofness (See Lemma 3
in Sen (2011) for a detailed argument). Hence, by the induction hypothesis, gτ(D)(PN∗) = 1 for all
PN∗ ∈ Dn−1 and g satisfies uncompromisingness. In terms of ϕ, this means ϕτ(D)(PN) = 1 for all
PN ∈ Dn with P1 = P2. In the next lemma, we show that ϕτ(D)(PN) = 1 and ϕ is tops-only over
all profiles PN where agents 1 and 2 have the same top alternative, i.e., r1(P1) = r1(P2).
Lemma A.3. Let PN , P′N ∈ Dn be two tops-equivalent profiles such that P1, P2 ∈ Dbj for some bj ∈ τ(D).
Then, ϕτ(D)(PN) = 1 and ϕ(PN) = ϕ(P′N).
Proof. Note that since g is uncompromising, g satisfies tops-onlyness. Because g is tops-only
and P1, P2 ∈ Dbj , we have g(P1, P−{1,2}) = g(P2, P−{1,2}), and hence ϕ(P1, P1, P−{1,2}) = ϕ(P2,
P2, P−{1,2}). We show ϕ(P1, P2, P−{1,2}) = ϕ(P1, P1, P−{1,2}). Using strategy-proofness of ϕ for
agent 2, we have ϕU(x,P1)(P1, P1, P−{1,2}) ≥ ϕU(x,P1)(P1, P2, P−{1,2}) for all x ∈ A, and using
that for agent 1, we have ϕU(x,P1)(P1, P2, P−{1,2}) ≥ ϕU(x,P1)(P2, P2, P−{1,2}) for all x ∈ A. Since
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ϕ(P1, P1, P−{1,2}) = ϕ(P2, P2, P−{1,2}), it follows from Remark 2.1 that ϕ(P1, P1, P−{1,2}) = ϕ(P1,
P2, P−{1,2}). Using a similar logic, we have ϕ(P′1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕ(P
′
1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}). Because g is
tops-only and PN, P′N are tops-equivalent, we have g(P1, P−{1,2}) = g(P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}). This means
ϕ(P1, P1, P−{1,2}) = ϕ(P′1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}), and hence ϕ(P1, P2, P−{1,2}) = ϕ(P
′
1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}). Moreover,
as ϕτ(D)(P1, P1, P−{1,2}) = 1, it follows that ϕτ(D)(P1, P2, P−{1,2}) = 1. 
Lemma A.4. Let PN , P′N ∈ Dn be such that P1, P2 ∈ Dbj and P′1, P′2 ∈ Dbj+l for some 1 ≤ j ≤ j+ l ≤ k,
and r1(Pi) = r1(P′i ) for all i 6= 1, 2. Then, ϕb(PN) = ϕb(P′N) for all b /∈ [bj, bj+l]τ(D).
Proof. Note that because g is uncompromising and gτ(D)(PN∗) = 1 for all PN∗ ∈ Dn−1, gb(P1,
P−{1,2}) = gb(P′1, P−{1,2}) for all b /∈ [bj, bj+l]τ(D). Moreover, since g is tops-only and r1(Pi) =
r1(P′i ) for all i ∈ {3, 4, . . . , n}, we have g(P′1, P−{1,2}) = g(P′1, P′−{1,2}). By the definition of g,
g(P1, P−{1,2}) = ϕ(P1, P1, P−{1,2}) and g(P′1, P−{1,2}) = ϕ(P
′
1, P
′
1, P−{1,2}). As r1(P1) = r1(P2)
and r1(P′1) = r1(P
′
2), Lemma A.3 implies ϕ(P1, P2, P−{1,2}) = ϕ(P1, P1, P−{1,2}) and ϕ(P′1, P
′
2,
P′−{1,2}) = ϕ(P
′
1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}). Combining all these, we have ϕ(P1, P2, P−{1,2}) = ϕ(P
′
1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2})
for all b /∈ [bj, bj+l]τ(D). 
Lemma A.5. Let PN , P′N ∈ Dn be such that P1, P2, P′1 ∈ Dbj and P′2 ∈ Dbj+l , and r1(Pi) = r1(P′i ) for all
i 6= 1, 2. Then, ϕc(PN) = ϕc(P′N) for all c /∈ U(bj+l, P′1) ∩U(bj, P′2).
Proof. By Lemma A.3, ϕ(P1, P2, P−{1,2}) = ϕ(P′1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}). Hence, it suffices to show that ϕc(P
′
1,
P′1, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕc(P
′
1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}) for c /∈ U(bj+l, P′1) ∩U(bj, P′2). We prove this for c /∈ U(bj+l, P′1),
the proof of the same when c /∈ U(bj, P′2) follows from symmetric argument.
Take c /∈ U(bj+l, P′1). Note that by strategy-proofness of ϕ,
ϕU(c,P′1)(P
′
1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}) ≥ ϕU(c,P′1)(P
′
1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}) ≥ ϕU(c,P′1)(P
′
2, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}).
Moreover, by Lemma A.4, ϕb(P′1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕb(P
′
2, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}) for all b /∈ [bj, bj+l]τ(D), and
hence ϕB(P′1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕB(P
′
2, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}) for all B ⊆ A such that [bj, bj+l]τ(D) ⊆ B. Since
c /∈ U(bj+l , P′1) and r1(P′1) = bj, by the definition of top-rich domain, we have [bj, bj+l]τ(D) ⊆ U(c,
P′1), and hence ϕU(c,P′1)(P
′
1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕU(c,P′1)(P
′
2, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}). Thus, we have
ϕU(c,P′1)(P
′
1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕU(c,P′1)(P
′
1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}). (1)
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Let d be the alternative such that dP′1!c. Then, [bj, bj+l]τ(D) ⊆ U(d, P′1), and hence
ϕU(d,P′1)(P
′
1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕU(d,P′1)(P
′
1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}). (2)
Subtracting (2) from (1), we have ϕc(P′1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕc(P
′
1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}), which completes the
proof of the lemma. 
Lemma A.6. Let Pbj,bj+1 , Pbj+1,bj ∈ D be such that U(bl, Pbj,bj+1)OU(bl, Pbj+1,bj) ⊆ τ(D) for all bl ∈
τ(D). Then, for all i ∈ N and all P−i ∈ Dn−1,
[ϕτ(D)(Pbj,bj+1 , P−i) = 1] =⇒ [ϕτ(D)(Pbj+1,bj , P−i) = 1].
Proof. Suppose not. Let Pbj,bj+1 and Pbj+1,bj be as defined in the lemma. Let c ∈ A \ τ(D) be
the highest ranked alternative in Pbj+1,bj that receives positive probability at ϕ(Pbj+1,bj , P−i), i.e.,
ϕc(Pbj+1,bj , P−i) > 0 and ϕd(Pbj+1,bj , P−i) = 0 for all d ∈ A \ τ(D) such that dPbj+1,bj c.
First, we show U(c, Pbj,bj+1)∩ τ(D) = U(c, Pbj+1,bj)∩ τ(D). Suppose not. Then, without loss of
generality, there exists b ∈ τ(D) such that b ∈ U(c, Pbj,bj+1) \U(c, Pbj+1,bj). However, this means
c ∈ U(b, Pbj+1,bj) and c /∈ U(b, Pbj,bj+1), and hence c ∈ U(b, Pbj,bj+1)OU(b, Pbj+1,bj). Since c /∈ τ(D),
this contradicts the assumption of lemma.
Next, we show ϕB′(P
bj,bj+1 , P−i) = ϕB′(Pbj+1,bj , P−i), where B′ = U(c, Pbj,bj+1) ∩ τ(D). As-
sume for contradiction that ϕB′(P
bj,bj+1 , P−i) 6= ϕB′(Pbj+1,bj , P−i). Suppose ϕB′(Pbj,bj+1 , P−i) <
ϕB′(P
bj+1,bj , P−i). Since ϕτ(D)(Pbj,bj+1 , P−i) = 1, we have ϕU(c,Pbj ,bj+1 )(P
bj,bj+1 , P−i) = ϕB′(Pbj,bj+1 ,
P−i). Therefore, agent i manipulates ϕ at (Pbj,bj+1 , P−i) via Pbj+1,bj . Now, suppose ϕB′(Pbj,bj+1 ,
P−i) > ϕB′(Pbj+1,bj , P−i). Let d be the alternative such that dPbj+1,bj !c. Then, by our assumption
on c, ϕ
U(d,Pbj+1,bj )
(Pbj+1,bj , P−i) = ϕB′(Pbj+1,bj , P−i). Hence, agent i manipulates at (Pbj+1,bj , P−i) via
Pbj,bj+1 .
Now, we complete the proof of the lemma. Since c is the highest ranked alternative in
A \ τ(D) that receives positive probability at ϕ(Pbj+1,bj , P−i), it follows that ϕU(c,Pbj ,bj+1 )(P
bj+1,bj ,
P−i) = ϕc(Pbj+1,bj , P−i) + ϕB′(Pbj+1,bj , P−i). Moreover, since ϕB′(Pbj,bj+1 , P−i) = ϕB′(Pbj+1,bj , P−i)
and ϕτ(D)(Pbj,bj+1 , P−i) = 1, we have ϕB′(Pbj,bj+1 , P−i) = ϕU(c,Pbj ,bj+1 )(P
bj,bj+1 , P−i). Combining all
these, we have ϕ
U(c,Pbj ,bj+1 )
(Pbj+1,bj , P−i) > ϕU(c,Pbj ,bj+1 )(P
bj,bj+1 , P−i), which means i manipulates
at (Pbj,bj+1 , P−i) via Pbj+1,bj , a contradiction. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
To simplify notation for the following lemma, for j < l, we define the distance from bl to bj,
25
denoted by bl − bj, as l − j.
Lemma A.7. The RSCF ϕ is tops-only and ϕτ(D)(PN) = 1 for all PN ∈ Dn.9
Proof. We prove this lemma by using induction on the distance between the top alternatives of
agents 1 and 2.
Take 0 ≤ l ≤ k − 1. Suppose ϕτ(D)(PN) = 1 and ϕ(PN) = ϕ(P˜N) for all tops-equivalent
profiles PN , P˜N ∈ Dn with |r1(P2)− r1(P1)| ≤ l. We show ϕτ(D)(P′N) = 1 and ϕ(P′N) = ϕ(P˜′N) for
all tops-equivalent profiles P′N, P˜
′
N ∈ Dn with |r1(P′2)− r1(P′1)| = l + 1.
Let PN, P′N be such that P1, P
′
1 ∈ Dbj , P2 ∈ Dbj+l , P′2 ∈ Dbj+l+1 , and r1(Pi) = r1(P′i ) for all
i 6= 1, 2. Further, let P¯1 = Pbj,bj+1 , Pˆ1 = Pbj+1,bj , Pˆ2 = Pbj+l ,bj+l+1 , and P¯2 = Pbj+l+1,bj+l be such that
U(bl, P¯i)OU(bl, Pˆi) ⊆ τ(D) for all i = 1, 2 and all bl ∈ τ(D). Note that such preferences exist by
the definition of top-rich domain. Then, by the induction hypothesis, ϕ(PN) = ϕ(P′1, Pˆ2, P
′
−{1,2}).
Now, we prove the following claims.
Claim 1. ϕτ(D)(P¯1, P¯2, P′−{1,2}) = 1 and ϕ(P¯1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕ(P
′
1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕ(P¯1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}).
By the induction hypothesis, ϕτ(D)(P′1, Pˆ2, P
′
−{1,2}) = 1 and ϕ(PN) = ϕ(P¯1, Pˆ2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕ(P
′
1,
Pˆ2, P′−{1,2}). Let P
′′
1 ∈ {P′1, P¯1}. By Lemma A.5,
ϕc(P′′1 , P
′′
1 , P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕc(P
′′
1 , Pˆ2, P
′
−{1,2}) for all c /∈ U(bj+l, P′′1 ) ∩U(bj, Pˆ2), (3)
and
ϕc(P′′1 , P
′′
1 , P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕc(P
′′
1 , P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) for all c /∈ U(bj+l+1, P′′1 ) ∩U(bj, P¯2). (4)
As r1(Pˆ2)− r1(P′′1 ) ≤ l, it follows from the induction hypothesis that ϕτ(D)(P′′1 , P′′1 , P′−{1,2}) =
ϕτ(D)(P′′1 , Pˆ2, P
′
−{1,2}) = 1. Since U(bj+l, P
′′
1 ) ∩U(bj, Pˆ2) ∩ τ(D) = [bj, bj+l]τ(D), (3) implies
ϕb(P′′1 , P
′′
1 , P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕb(P
′′
1 , Pˆ2, P
′
−{1,2}) for all b /∈ [bj, bj+l]τ(D). (5)
Moreover, since Pˆ2 = Pbj+l ,bj+l+1 , P¯2 = Pbj+l+1,bj+l , and ϕτ(D)(P′′1 , Pˆ2, P
′
−{1,2}) = 1, by Lemma
A.6, ϕτ(D)(P′′1 , P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) = 1. This, in particular, means ϕτ(D)(P¯1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) = 1. Because
U(bj+l+1, P′′1 ) ∩U(bj, P¯2) ∩ τ(D) = [bj, bj+l+1]τ(D), (4) implies
9 Chatterji and Zeng (2015) provides a sufficient condition for a domain to be tops-only for RSCFs. However,
top-rich domains do not satisfy their condition.
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ϕb(P′′1 , P
′′
1 , P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕb(P
′′
1 , P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) for all b /∈ [bj, bj+l+1]τ(D). (6)
Combining (5) and (6), ϕb(P′′1 , Pˆ2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕb(P
′′
1 , P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) for all b /∈ [bj, bj+l+1]τ(D). Since
Pˆ2 = Pbj+l ,bj+l+1 and P¯2 = Pbj+l+1,bj+l , we have by strategy-proofness that ϕ{bj+l ,bj+l+1}(P
′′
1 , Pˆ2,
P′−{1,2}) = ϕ{bj+l ,bj+l+1}(P
′′
1 , P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}). Let B
′ = [bj, bj+l+1]τ(D) \ {bj+l, bj+l+1}. Then, ϕB′(P′′1 , Pˆ2,
P′−{1,2}) = ϕB′(P
′′
1 , P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}). Note that by Lemma A.1, Pˆ2|B′ = P¯2|B′ . Therefore, by Lemma
A.2,
ϕb(P′′1 , Pˆ2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕb(P
′′
1 , P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) for all b 6= bj+l, bj+l+1. (7)
By the induction hypothesis, ϕ(P¯1, Pˆ2, P′−{1,2}) = ϕ(P
′
1, Pˆ2, P
′
−{1,2}). Again, by Lemma A.1,
bj+l P¯1bj+l+1 and bj+lP′1bj+l+1, which means ϕ(P¯1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕ(P
′
1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}). Using a similar
logic, ϕ(P¯1, P¯2, P′−{1,2}) = ϕ(P¯1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}). This completes the proof of Claim 1.
Claim 2. ϕc(P′1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕc(P
′
N) for all c /∈ U(bj+l+1, P′1) ∩U(bj, P′2).
By (6), ϕb(P′1, P
′
1, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕb(P
′
1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) for all b /∈ [bj, bj+l+1]τ(D). Since [bj, bj+l+1]τ(D) ⊆
U(bj+l+1, P′1) ∩ U(bj, P′2), we have ϕc(P′1, P′1, P′−{1,2}) = ϕc(P′1, P¯2, P′−{1,2}) for all c /∈ U(bj+l+1,
P′1) ∩ U(bj, P′2). Moreover, by Lemma A.5, ϕc(P′1, P′1, P′−{1,2}) = ϕc(P′N) for all c /∈ U(bj+l+1,
P′1) ∩ U(bj, P′2). Hence, ϕc(P′1, P¯2, P′−{1,2}) = ϕc(P′N) for all c /∈ U(bj+l+1, P′1) ∩ U(bj, P′2). This
completes the proof of Claim 2.
Claim 3. ϕb(P′1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕb(P
′
N) for all b ∈ [bj, bj+l+1]τ(D).
First, we show ϕbj(P
′
1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕbj(P
′
N). By Claim 1, ϕ(P
′
1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕ(P¯1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}).
Moreover, as r1(P¯1) = r1(P′1) = bj, by strategy-proofness, ϕbj(P¯1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕbj(P
′
N). Combin-
ing, we have ϕbj(P
′
1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕbj(P
′
N).
Now, we complete the proof of Claim 3 by induction. Take s < l + 1. Suppose ϕbj+r(P
′
1, P¯2,
P′−{1,2}) = ϕbj+r(P
′
N) for all 0 ≤ r ≤ s. We show ϕbj+s+1(P′1, P¯2, P′−{1,2}) = ϕbj+s+1(P′N). We show
this in two steps. In Step 1, we show that if an alternative outside τ(D) appears above bj+s+1 in
the preference P′1, then it receives zero probability at ϕ(P
′
N). In Step 2, we use this fact to complete
the proof of the claim.
STEP 1. Take c ∈ A \ τ(D) such that cP′1bj+s+1. We show ϕc(P′N) = 0. Assume for contradiction
that ϕc(P′N) > 0. Since cP
′
1bj+s+1, by the definition of top-rich domain, we have bj+s+1P
′
2c. Let
t ∈ {2, . . . , k− j− l} be such that U(bj+s+1, P′2)∩ τ(D) = [bj+s+1, bj+l+1]τ(D) ∪ [bj+l+2, bj+l+t]τ(D).
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By Claim 1, ϕτ(D)(P′1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) = 1, and hence
ϕU(bj+s+1,P′2)(P
′
1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕ[bj+s+1,bj+l+1]τ(D)(P
′
1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) + ϕ[bj+l+2,bj+l+t]τ(D)(P
′
1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2})
= 1− ϕ[b1,bj+s]τ(D)(P′1, P¯2, P′−{1,2})− ϕ[bj+l+t+1,bk]τ(D)(P′1, P¯2, P′−{1,2}).
(8)
By Claim 2, ϕbi(P
′
1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕbi(P
′
N) for all i ∈ [1, j− 1]∪ [j+ l + t+ 1, k], and by the assump-
tion of Claim 3, ϕbi(P
′
1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕbi(P
′
N) for all i ∈ [j, j + s]. Combining all these, we have
ϕ[b1,bj+s]τ(D)(P
′
1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕ[b1,bj+s]τ(D)(P
′
N) and ϕ[bj+l+t+1,bk]τ(D)(P
′
1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕ[bj+l+t+1,bk]τ(D)(P
′
N).
Note that the sets [b1, bj+s]τ(D), U(bj+s+1, P′2), [bj+l+t+1, bk]τ(D), and {c} are pairwise disjoint.
Therefore, ϕ[b1,bj+s]τ(D)(P
′
N) + ϕU(bj+s+1,P′2)(P
′
N) + ϕ[bj+l+t+1,bk]τ(D)(P
′
N) + ϕc(P
′
N) ≤ 1. Hence,
ϕU(bj+s+1,P′2)(P
′
N) ≤ 1− ϕ[b1,bj+s]τ(D)(P′N)− ϕ[bj+l+t+1,bk]τ(D)(P′N)− ϕc(P′N)
= 1− ϕ[b1,bj+s]τ(D)(P′1, P¯2, P′−{1,2})− ϕ[bj+l+t+1,bk]τ(D)(P′1, P¯2, P′−{1,2})− ϕc(P′N).
(9)
As ϕc(P′N) > 0, (8) and (9) imply ϕU(bj+s+1,P′2)(P
′
1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) > ϕU(bj+s+1,P′2)(P
′
N), which means
agent 2 manipulates at P′N via P¯2, a contradiction. This completes Step 1.
STEP 2. In this step, we complete the proof of the claim. In view of Claim 1, it is sufficient to show
that ϕbj+s+1(P¯1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕbj+s+1(P
′
N).
Suppose ϕbj+s+1(P¯1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}) > ϕbj+s+1(P
′
N). If d ∈ U(bj+s+1, P′1) \ τ(D), then by Step 1,
ϕd(P′1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕd(P
′
N), and by Claim 1, ϕd(P
′
1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕd(P¯1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}). On the
other hand, if d ∈ U(bj+s+1, P′1) ∩ τ(D) and d 6= bj+s+1, which in turn means d = bj′ for some
j′ ≤ j + s, then by Claim 2 and the assumption of Claim 3, ϕd(P′1, P¯2, P′−{1,2}) = ϕd(P′N). Also, by
Claim 1, ϕ(P′1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕ(P¯1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}). Combining all these, we have ϕd(P¯1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}) =
ϕd(P′N) for all d ∈ U(bj+s+1, P′1) \ bj+s+1. Therefore, ϕbj+s+1(P¯1, P′2, P′−{1,2}) > ϕbj+s+1(P′N) implies
ϕU(bj+s+1,P′1)(P¯1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}) > ϕU(bj+s+1,P′1)(P
′
N), which means agent 1 manipulates at P
′
N via P¯1.
Now, suppose ϕbj+s+1(P¯1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}) < ϕbj+s+1(P
′
N). By Claim 1, ϕτ(D)(P¯1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}) = 1. Let
u ≤ j be such that U(bj+s+1, P¯1) ∩ τ(D) = [bu, bj+s+1]τ(D). Then, by the assumption of Claim 3,
ϕb(P¯1, P′2, P′−{1,2}) = ϕb(P
′
N) for all b ∈ [bj, bj+s]τ(D), and by Claim 2, ϕb(P¯1, P′2, P′−{1,2}) = ϕb(P′N)
for all b ∈ [bu, bj−1]τ(D). Therefore, ϕbj+s+1(P¯1, P′2, P′−{1,2}) < ϕbj+s+1(P′N) implies ϕU(bj+s+1,P¯1)(P¯1,
P′2, P′−{1,2}) < ϕU(bj+s+1,P¯1)(P
′
N), which means agent 1 manipulates at (P¯1, P
′
2, P
′
−{1,2}) via P
′
1. This
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completes the proof of Claim 3.
We are now ready to complete the proof of Lemma A.7. First, we show ϕτ(D)(P′N) = 1. By
Claim 3, ϕb(P′1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕb(P
′
N) for all b ∈ [bj, bj+l+1]τ(D). By Claim 2, ϕb(P′1, P¯2, P′−{1,2}) =
ϕb(P′N) for all b ∈ [b1, bj−1]τ(D) ∪ [bj+l+2, bk]τ(D). Combining, we have ϕτ(D)(P′1, P¯2, P′−{1,2}) =
ϕτ(D)(P′N). Moreover, by Claim 1, ϕτ(D)(P
′
1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) = 1, and hence ϕτ(D)(P
′
N) = 1.
Now, we show ϕ(P′N) = ϕ(P˜
′
N) for all tops-equivalent profiles P
′
N, P˜
′
N ∈ Dn. By Claim 1,
2, and 3, ϕ(P¯1, P¯2, P′−{1,2}) = ϕ(P
′
N). Moreover, as P˜
′
1 ∈ Dbj and P˜′2 ∈ Dbj+l+1 , applying Claim
1, 2, and 3 to P˜′N, we have ϕ(P¯1, P¯2, P˜
′
−{1,2}) = ϕ(P˜
′
N). Hence, to show ϕ(P
′
N) = ϕ(P˜
′
N), it
is enough to show ϕ(P¯1, P¯2, P′−{1,2}) = ϕ(P¯1, P¯2, P˜
′
−{1,2}). Recall that Pˆ2 = P
bj+l ,bj+l+1 . Since
r1(Pˆ2)− r1(P′1) = l and r1(P′i ) = r1(P˜′i ) for all i 6= 1, 2, by the assumption of Lemma A.7, we
have ϕ(P¯1, Pˆ2, P′−{1,2}) = ϕ(P¯1, Pˆ2, P˜
′
−{1,2}). Also, by (7), ϕb(P¯1, Pˆ2, P
′
−{1,2}) = ϕb(P¯1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2})
for all b 6= bj+l , bj+l+1, which means ϕb(P¯1, P¯2, P′−{1,2}) = ϕb(P¯1, P¯2, P˜′−{1,2}) for all b 6= bj+l , bj+l+1.
Using a similar argument as for the proof of (7), it follows that ϕ(P¯1, P¯2, P′−{1,2}) = ϕ(Pˆ1, P¯2,
P′−{1,2}) for all b 6= bj, bj+1, and hence ϕ(P¯1, P¯2, P′−{1,2}) = ϕ(P¯1, P¯2, P˜′−{1,2}) for all b 6= bj, bj+1.
Note that if l ≥ 1, then ϕb(P¯1, P¯2, P′−{1,2}) = ϕb(P¯1, P¯2, P˜′−{1,2}) for all b ∈ A. Therefore, we
show ϕ(P¯1, P¯2, P′−{1,2}) = ϕ(P¯1, P¯2, P˜
′
−{1,2}) for r1(P¯1) = bj and r1(P¯2) = bj+1. Because ϕb(P¯1, P¯2,
P′−{1,2}) = ϕb(P¯1, P¯2, P˜
′
−{1,2}) for all b 6= bj, bj+1 and all tops-equivalent P′−{1,2}, P˜′−{1,2} ∈ Dn−2,
we have ϕb(P¯1, P¯2, P′−{1,2}) = ϕb(P¯1, P¯2, P˜
′
3, P
′
−{1,2,3}) for all b 6= bj, bj+1. As r1(P′3) = r1(P˜′3),
by Lemma A.1, bjP′3bj+1 if and only if bjP˜′3bj+1. Therefore, if ϕbj(P¯1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) 6= ϕbj(P¯1, P¯2,
P˜′3, P′−{1,2,3}), then agent 3 manipulates either at (P¯1, P¯2, P
′
−{1,2}) via P˜
′
3 or at (P¯1, P¯2, P˜
′
3, P
′
−{1,2,3})
via P′3. Hence, ϕ(P¯1, P¯2, P′−{1,2}) = ϕ(P¯1, P¯2, P˜
′
3, P
′
−{1,2,3}). Continuing in this manner, we have
ϕ(P¯1, P¯2, P′−{1,2}) = ϕ(P¯1, P¯2, P˜
′
−{1,2}). Therefore, ϕ(P
′
N) = ϕ(P˜
′
N) for all tops-equivalent profiles
P′N, P˜
′
N ∈ Dn. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Lemma A.8. The RSCF ϕ satisfies uncompromisingness.
Proof. We prove this in two steps. In Step 1, we provide a sufficient condition for uncompromis-
ingness, and in Step 2, we use that to prove the lemma.
STEP 1. We show that if for all j, j + 1 ∈ {1, . . . , k}, all Pi = Pbj,bj+1 ∈ D, all P′i = Pbj+1,bj ∈ D, all
P−i and all b 6= [r1(Pi), r1(P′i )],
ϕb(Pi, P−i) = ϕb(P′i , P−i), (10)
then ϕ is uncompromising.
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Suppose (10) holds. Since ϕ is tops-only, (10) implies for all Pi ∈ Dbj , all P′i ∈ Dbj+1 , all P−i, and
all b /∈ [r1(Pi), r1(P′i )],
ϕb(Pi, P−i) = ϕb(P′i , P−i). (11)
Similarly, for all P¯i ∈ Dbj+1 , all P¯′i ∈ Dbj+2 , all P−i, and all b /∈ [r1(P¯i), r1(P¯′i )],
ϕb(P¯i, P−i) = ϕb(P¯′i , P−i). (12)
Combining (11) and (12), we have for all Pi ∈ Dbj , all P¯′i ∈ Dbj+2 , all P−i, and all b /∈ [r1(Pi), r1(P¯′i )],
ϕb(Pi, P−i) = ϕb(P¯′i , P−i). Continuing in this manner, we have for all Pi, P
′
i ∈ D, all P−i, and all
b /∈ [r1(Pi), r1(P′i )], ϕb(Pi, P−i) = ϕb(P′i , P−i), which means ϕ is uncompromising.
STEP 2. In this step, we show that ϕ satisfies (10). First, we show (10) for agent 1. Without
loss of generality, assume r1(P2) = bj+l. Note that by Lemma A.7, ϕτ(D)(PN) = 1. Therefore,
by Lemma A.5, ϕb(P1, P2, P−{1,2}) = ϕb(P2, P2, P−{1,2}) for all b /∈ [bj, bj+l]τ(D) and ϕb(P′1, P2,
P−{1,2}) = ϕb(P2, P2, P−{1,2}) for all b /∈ [bj+1, bj+l]τ(D). This means ϕb(P1, P2, P−{1,2}) = ϕb(P′1,
P2, P−{1,2}) for all b /∈ [bj, bj+l]τ(D). By strategy-proofness, ϕ{bj,bj+1}(P1, P2, P−{1,2}) = ϕ{bj,bj+1}(P′1,
P2, P−{1,2}). Let B′ = [bj, bj+l]τ(D) \ {bj, bj+1}. Since P1|B′ = P′1|B′ , in view of Lemma A.2, we have
ϕb(P1, P2, P−{1,2}) = ϕb(P′1, P2, P−{1,2}) for all b 6= bj, bj+l. This proves (10) for agent 1. Using a
symmetric argument, (10) can be shown for agent 2. Therefore, by Step 1, we have
ϕb(Pi, P−i) = ϕb(P′i , P−i) for all P−i, all b /∈ [r1(Pi), r1(P′i )], and all i = 1, 2. (13)
Now, we show (10) for agents i ∈ {3, . . . , n}. It is enough to show this for i = 3. If P1 = P2, then
by the induction hypothesis, ϕb(P3, P−3) = gb(P1, P3, P−{1,2,3}) = gb(P1, P′3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕb(P′3,
P−3) for all P3, P′3 ∈ D and all b /∈ [r1(P3), r1(P′3)]. Let r1(P1) = bp and r1(P2) = bq. Since
ϕτ(D)(PN) = 1 for all PN ∈ Dn, it follows from Lemma A.5 that ϕb(P1, P1, P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕb(P1,
P2, P3, P−{1,2,3}) for all b /∈ [bp, bq]τ(D) and ϕb(P1, P1, P′3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕb(P1, P2, P′3, P−{1,2,3}) for all
b /∈ [bp, bq]τ(D). Combining all these, we have
ϕb(P1, P2, P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕb(P1, P2, P′3, P−{1,2,3}) for all b /∈ [bp, bq]τ(D) ∪ [bj, bj+1]τ(D). (14)
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Also, by strategy-proofness,
ϕ{bj,bj+1}(P1, P2, P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕ{bj,bj+1}(P1, P2, P
′
3, P−{1,2,3}). (15)
Now, we distinguish two cases.
Case 1. Suppose [p, q ≤ j + 1] or [p, q ≥ j].
Let B′ = [bp, bq]τ(D) \ [bj, bj+1]τ(D). Then, by (14) and (15), ϕB′(P1, P2, P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕB′(P1, P2,
P′3, P−{1,2,3}). Since P3|B′ = P′3|B′ , by Lemma A.2, ϕb(P1, P2, P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕb(P1, P2, P′3, P−{1,2,3})
for all b ∈ B′. Therefore,
ϕb(P1, P2, P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕb(P1, P2, P′3, P−{1,2,3}) for all b /∈ {bj, bj+1}. (16)
This completes the proof of the lemma for Case 1.
Case 2. Suppose p < j ≤ j + 1 < q or q < j ≤ j + 1 < p.
We prove the lemma for the case p < j ≤ j + 1 < q, the proof of the same for the case
q < j ≤ j + 1 < p follows from symmetric arguments. By (13), for all b /∈ [bj, bq]τ(D), ϕb(P1,
P2, P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕb(P1, P3, P3, P−{1,2,3}) and ϕb(P1, P2, P′3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕb(P1, P3, P′3, P−{1,2,3}).
Moreover, since r1(P1) ≤ bj+1, r1(P3) = bj and r1(P′3) = bj+1, it follows from (16) that ϕb(P1, P3,
P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕb(P1, P3, P′3, P−{1,2,3}) for all b /∈ [bj, bj+1]τ(D). Combining all these, ϕb(P1, P2, P3,
P−{1,2,3}) = ϕb(P1, P2, P′3, P−{1,2,3}) for all b /∈ [bj, bq]τ(D). By strategy-proofness, ϕ{bj,bj+1}(P1, P2,
P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕ{bj,bj+1}(P1, P2, P
′
3, P−{1,2,3}). Let B′ = [bj, bq]τ(D) \ {bj, bj+1}. Since P3|B′ = P′3|B′ ,
by Lemma A.2, we have ϕb(P1, P2, P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕb(P1, P2, P′3, P−{1,2,3}) for all b ∈ B′. Hence,
ϕb(P1, P2, P3, P−{1,2,3}) = ϕb(P1, P2, P′3, P−{1,2,3}) for all b /∈ {bj, bj+1},
which completes the proof of the lemma for Case 2.
Since Cases 1 and 2 are exhaustive, this completes the proof of Lemma A.8. 
Theorem 3.1 now follows by applying Lemma A.7 and Lemma A.8. 
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B. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2
In this section, we present the proof of Theorem 3.2. Our proof uses the following theorem, which
is taken from Peters et al. (2014).
Theorem B.1 (Theorem 3(a) in Peters et al. (2014)). Let D be the maximal single-peaked domain.
Then, every tops-only and strategy-proof RSCF ϕ : Dn → 4A is a convex combination of tops-only and
strategy-proof DSCFs f : Dn → A.
The following lemma establishes the structure of an uncompromising RSCF on a regular
single-peaked domain.
Lemma B.1. Let D be a regular single-peaked domain and let ϕ : Dn → 4A be uncompromising and
strategy-proof. Then, ϕ is a convex combination of the generalized min-max rules on Dn.10
Proof. Note that since ϕ is uncompromising, by Remark 2.4, ϕ is tops-only. Let Dˆ be the maximal
single-peaked domain. Let ϕˆ : Dˆn → 4A be the tops-only extension of ϕ on Dˆ. More formally,
for all PˆN ∈ Dˆn, ϕˆ(PˆN) = ϕ(PN), where PN ∈ Dn is such that PN, PˆN are tops-equivalent. This is
well-defined as ϕ is tops-only andD is regular. Since Dˆ is single-peaked and ϕ is uncompromising
and strategy-proof, ϕˆ is also strategy-proof. Hence, by Theorem B.1, ϕˆ is a convex combination of
the generalized min-max rules on Dˆn. By the definition of ϕˆ, this means ϕ is a convex combination
of the generalized min-max rules on Dn, which completes the proof. 
Now, we proceed to prove Theorem 3.2.
Proof. (If Part) Let D be a top-rich domain with τ(D) = {b1, . . . , bk} and let ϕ : Dn → 4A be a
TRM rule. Since ϕ is a TRM rule, it is unanimous by definition. We show that ϕ is strategy-proof.
Let ϕ = ∑tl=1 λl fl, where λls are non-negative numbers summing to 1 and fls are TM rules. To
show that ϕ is strategy-proof, it is enough to show that fls are strategy-proof. For all l ∈ {1, . . . , t},
define fˆl : (D|τ(D))n → τ(D) as fˆl(PN|τ(D)) = fl(PN). Note that by Lemma A.1, D|τ(D) is a
single-peaked domain. Therefore, it follows from Moulin (1980) that fˆl is strategy-proof for all l.
By Remark 2.3, this means fl is strategy-proof for all l. This completes the proof of the if part.
(Only-if Part) Let D be a top-rich domain with τ(D) = {b1, . . . , bk} and let ϕ : Dn → 4A be a
unanimous and strategy-proof RSCF. Define ϕˆ : (D|τ(D))n → 4τ(D) as ϕˆb(PN|τ(D)) = ϕb(PN)
10If the set of alternatives is an interval of real numbers, then uncompromisingness implies strategy-proofness for
the RSCFs on the maximal single-peaked domain (see Lemma 3.2 in Ehlers et al. (2002)). However, the same does not
hold for the case of finitely many alternatives.
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for all b ∈ τ(D). This is well-defined as by Theorem 3.1 and Remark 2.4, ϕτ(D)(PN) = 1
for all PN ∈ Dn and ϕ is tops-only. Because ϕ satisfies uncompromisingness, ϕˆ also satisfies
uncompromisingness. Hence, by Lemma B.1, ϕˆ is convex combination of generalized min-max
rules on (D|τ(D))n. Moreover, since ϕ is unanimous, ϕˆ is a also unanimous. This means ϕˆ is a
convex combination of min-max rules on (D|τ(D))n. By the definition of ϕˆ, this means ϕ is a TRM
rule. This completes the proof of the only-if part. 
C. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.3
Proof. If part of the theorem follows from Theorem 3.2. We prove the only-if part. Let D be a
top-connected TRM domain. We show that D is a top-rich domain satisfying top-connectedness.
In particular, we show that D satisfies Condition (i) and (ii) in Definition 2.8.
Lemma C.1. The domain D satisfies Condition (i) in Definition 2.8.
Proof. Let τ(D) = {b1, . . . , bk}. Take j < k. Since D is top-connected, there are P, P′ ∈ D such
that r1(P) = bj, r1(P′) = bj+1, and P∼P′. Therefore, U(bj, P)OU(bj, P′) = bj+1 and U(bj+1,
P)OU(bj+1, P′) = bj. Moreover, by top-connectedness, for all l /∈ {j, j + 1}, U(bl, P)OU(bl,
P′) = ∅. This shows D satisfies Condition (i) in Definition 2.8. 
Lemma C.2. The domain D satisfies Condition (ii) in Definition 2.8.
Proof. Let τ(D) = {b1, . . . , bk}. By Lemma 3.1, for all r < s < t and all Pbr , Pbt ∈ D, we have
U(bs, Pbr) ∩ U(bs, Pbt) ∩ τ(D) = bs. We show that U(bs, Pbr) ∩ U(bs, Pbt) = bs. Assume for
contradiction that U(bs, Pbr) ∩ U(bs, Pbt) ) bs for some r, t with r < s < t. Without loss of
generality, assume that bs is the maximum alternative for which U(bs, Pbr) ∩U(bs, Pbt) ) bs for
some r < s < t, that is, for all v > s and all u, w with u < v < w, U(bv, Pbu) ∩U(bv, Pbw) = bv.
SinceD|τ(D) is single-peaked by Lemma 3.1, there cannot be any b ∈ τ(D) \ bs such that b ∈ U(bs,
Pbr) ∩U(bs, Pbt). Therefore, suppose x /∈ τ(D) is such that x ∈ U(bs, Pbr) ∩U(bs, Pbt). In the
following, we construct a unanimous and strategy-proof DSCF on Dn that is not a TRM rule.
Consider the following DSCF:
f (PN) =

r1(P2) if r1(P2)  r1(P1),
x if r1(P1) ≺ bs ≺ r1(P2) and xPibs for all i ∈ {1, 2},
med{bs, r1(P1), r1(P2)} otherwise,
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where med represents the median w.r.t. ≺.
Clearly, f is not a TRM rule since f (PN) = x for some PN ∈ D and x /∈ τ(D). Moreover, f
is unanimous by definition. We show that f is strategy-proof. Note that agents i ∈ N \ {1, 2}
cannot manipulate as f does not depend on their preferences. Let P = {PN ∈ Dn | f (PN) 6= x}.
Then, by the definition of f , f restricted to P is a tops-restricted min-max rule. This, together with
the facts that D|τ(D) is single-peaked and P|τ(D) ⊆ Dn|τ(D), means f cannot be manipulated by
some agent i ∈ N at a profile PN ∈ P via some P′i such that (P′i , P−i) ∈ P . Now, we distinguish
the following cases.
CASE 1. Suppose PN ∈ Dn \ P .
By the definition of P , this means r1(P1) ≺ bs ≺ r1(P2), xPibs for all i ∈ {1, 2}, and f (PN) = x.
We show that agent 1 cannot manipulate f at PN, the proof of the same for agent 2 is symmetric.
Let P′1 ∈ D be such that r1(P′1) ≺ bs. Then, by the definition of f , f (P′1, P−1) ∈ {x, bs}. Since
xP1bs, agent 1 cannot manipulate at PN via P′1. Let P
′
1 ∈ D be such that r1(P′1)  bs. Suppose
f (P′1, P−1) = b. Then, by the definition of f , b ∈ τ(D) and b  bs. Becuase P1|τ(D) is single-peaked
and xP1bs, we have xP1b. Therefore, agent 1 cannot manipulate f at PN via P′1.
CASE 2. Suppose PN ∈ P . We distinguish the following subcases.
CASE 2.a. Suppose r1(P1) ≺ r1(P2). Suppose further that r1(P1) ≺ r1(P2) ≺ bs. Then, by the
definition of f , f (P′1, P−1) 6= x for all P′1 ∈ D, and hence agent 1 cannot manipulate f at PN . Note
that since f (PN) = r1(P2), agent 2 does not have any incentive to manipulate at PN . Now, suppose
r1(P1) ≺ bs ≺ r1(P2). Then, f (PN) = bs. Moreover, since PN ∈ P , there exists i ∈ {1, 2} such that
bsPix. So, by the definition of f , the other agent j ∈ {1, 2} \ i cannot change the outcome to x, and
hence cannot manipulate. Also, as f (PN) = bs and bsPix, agent i does not have any incentive to
manipulate. Finally, suppose bs ≺ r1(P1) ≺ r1(P2). Then, by the definition of f , f (P′2, P−2) 6= x
for all P′2 ∈ D, and hence agent 2 cannot manipulate f at PN. Moreover, since f (PN) = r1(P1),
agent 1 does not have any incentive to manipulate at PN.
CASE 2.b. Suppose r1(P2) ≺ r1(P1). Then, by the definition of f , f (PN) = r1(P2). Therefore, agent
2 does not have any incentive to manipulate at PN. If r1(P2)  bs, then f (P′1, P−1) 6= x for all
P′1 ∈ D, and hence agent 1 cannot manipulate at PN via P′1. Now, suppose bs ≺ r1(P2). We show
r1(P2)P1x. Recall that x /∈ τ(D), which in particular means r1(P2) 6= x. Therefore, assume for
contradiction that xP1r1(P2). Since x ∈ U(bs, Pbr) ∩U(bs, Pbt), we have xPbr bs. Also, since D|τ(D)
is single-peaked and bs ≺ r1(P2), we have bsPbr r1(P2). Combining all these, we have xPbrr1(P2).
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This means br ≺ r1(P2) ≺ r1(P1) and x ∈ U(r1(P2), Pbr) ∩U(r1(P2), P1). Since bs ≺ r1(P2), this is
a contradiction to the maximality of bs. So, agent 1 cannot manipulate f at PN. This shows that f
is strategy-proof. 
Now, the proof of Theorem 3.3 follows from Lemma C.1 and Lemma C.2. 
D. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.4
Proof. Let D be a top-rich domain satisfying top-connectedness with τ(D) = {b1, . . . , bk} and let
ϕ : Dn → 4A be a tops-only and strategy-proof RSCF. Take PN ∈ Dn and i ∈ N. Suppose r1(Pi) =
bj. Let ϕτ(D)(PN) = α for some 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Take Pbj,bj+1 ∈ D. By tops-onlyness, ϕ(Pbj,bj+1 , P−i) =
ϕ(PN). Now, take Pbj+1,bj ∈ D such that Pbj,bj+1 ∼ Pbj+1,bj . By strategy-proofness, ϕd(Pbj,bj+1 ,
P−i) = ϕd(Pbj+1,bj , P−i) for all d ∈ A \ {bj, bj+1}. Again, take P′′i ∈ D with r1(P′′i ) = bj+1. By tops-
onlyness, ϕ(Pbj+1,bj , P−i) = ϕ(P′′i , P−i). Therefore, ϕτ(D)(P
′′
i , P−i) = α and ϕB(Pi, P−i) = ϕB(P
′′
i ,
P−i) for all B ⊆ A \ {bj, bj+1}. Continuing in this manner, it follows that ϕτ(D)(PN) = ϕτ(D)(Pˆi,
P−i) = α and ϕB(PN) = ϕB(Pˆi, P−i) for all B ⊆ A \ [r1(Pi), r1(Pˆi)]|τ(D) and all Pˆi ∈ D. Since i is
arbitrary, this proves ϕτ(D)(PN) = α for all PN ∈ Dn, and ϕ is uncompromising and ϕc(PN) =
ϕc(P′N) for all PN, P
′
N ∈ Dn and all c ∈ A \ τ(D). 
E. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.5
Proof. (If Part) Let D be a top-rich domain satisfying top-connectedness with τ(D) = {b1, . . . , bk}
and let ϕ : Dn → 4A be a convex combination of GTM rules and non-top constant rules. Then, ϕ
is tops-only by definition. We show that ϕ is strategy-proof. Note that non-top constant rules are
trivially strategy-proof. Therefore, since ϕ is a convex combination of GTM rules and non-top
constant rules, it is enough to show that every GTM rule is strategy-proof. Let f : Dn → A be
a GTM rule. Define fˆ : (D|τ(D))n → τ(D) as fˆ (PN|τ(D)) = f (PN). By Lemma A.1, D|τ(D) is
single-peaked domain. Therefore, it follows from Moulin (1980) that fˆl is strategy-proof for all l.
Hence, by Remark 2.3, fl is strategy-proof.
(Only-if Part) Let D be a top-rich domain satisfying top-connectedness with τ(D) = {b1, . . . ,
bk} and let ϕ : Dn → 4A be a tops-only and strategy-proof RSCF. In view of Theorem 3.4, let
0 ≤ α ≤ 1 be such that ϕτ(D)(PN) = α for all PN ∈ Dn. If α = 0, then ϕb(PN) = 0 for all b ∈ τ(D)
and all PN ∈ Dn. Therefore, by Theorem 3.4, ϕ is a convex combination of non-top constant rules.
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Suppose α > 0. Define ϕˆ : (D|τ(D))n → 4τ(D) as ϕˆb(PN|τ(D)) = 1αϕb(PN) for all b ∈ τ(D) and
all PN|τ(D) ∈ (D|τ(D))n. Then, the RSCF ϕˆ is well-defined by Theorem 3.4. Clearly, ϕˆ satisfies
uncompromisingness. Hence, by Lemma B.1, ϕˆ is a convex combination of generalized min-max
rules. Suppose ϕˆ = ∑Ll=1 λl fl, where for l = 1, . . . , L, λls are non-negative numbers summing to
1, and fl is a generalized min-max rule for all l. By Theorem 3.4, we have ϕc(PN) = ϕc(P′N) for all
c ∈ A \ τ(D) and all PN, P′N ∈ Dn. Let λc = ϕc(PN) for all c ∈ A \ τ(D) and all PN ∈ Dn. Then,
ϕ = ∑Ll=1 αλl fl +∑c∈A\τ(D) λc fc, where fc is the non-top constant rule given by fc(PN) = c for all
PN ∈ Dn. Since ∑c∈A\τ(D) ϕc(PN) = 1− α, this means ϕ is a convex combination of generalized
min-max and non-top constant rules. 
REFERENCES
ASWAL, N., S. CHATTERJI, AND A. SEN (2003): “Dictatorial domains,” Economic Theory, 22, 45–62.
AUSTEN-SMITH, D. AND J. S. BANKS (2000): Positive political theory I: collective preference, vol. 1,
University of Michigan Press.
BARBERA`, S., D. BERGA, AND B. MORENO (2010): “Individual versus group strategy-proofness:
when do they coincide?” Journal of Economic Theory, 145, 1648–1674.
BARBERA, S. AND M. O. JACKSON (2004): “Choosing how to choose: Self-stable majority rules
and constitutions,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1011–1048.
BLACK, D. (1948): “On the rationale of group decision-making,” The Journal of Political Economy,
23–34.
CARROLL, G. (2012): “When are local incentive constraints sufficient?” Econometrica, 80, 661–686.
CHATTERJI, S. AND H. ZENG (2015): “On Random Social Choice Functions with the Tops-only
Property,” .
DEMANGE, G. (1994): “Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures,” Journal of
Mathematical Economics, 23, 45–58.
EHLERS, L., H. PETERS, AND T. STORCKEN (2002): “Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes
for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences,” Journal of economic theory, 105, 408–434.
EPPLE, D. AND G. J. PLATT (1998): “Equilibrium and local redistribution in an urban economy
when households differ in both preferences and incomes,” Journal of urban Economics, 43, 23–51.
EPPLE, D., R. ROMANO, AND H. SIEG (2006): “Admission, tuition, and financial aid policies in
the market for higher education,” Econometrica, 74, 885–928.
36
EPPLE, D., T. ROMER, AND H. SIEG (2001): “Interjurisdictional sorting and majority rule: an
empirical analysis,” Econometrica, 69, 1437–1465.
GERSHKOV, A., B. MOLDOVANU, AND X. SHI (2013): “Optimal voting rules,” Tech. rep., SFB/TR
15 Discussion Paper.
GIBBARD, A. (1973): “Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result,” Econometrica: Journal of
the Econometric Society, 587–601.
——— (1977): “Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance,” Econometrica: Journal of
the Econometric Society, 665–681.
KUNG, F.-C. (2006): “An algorithm for stable and equitable coalition structures with public
goods,” Journal of Public Economic Theory, 8, 345–355.
MELTZER, A. H. AND S. F. RICHARD (1981): “A rational theory of the size of government,” The
Journal of Political Economy, 914–927.
MOULIN, H. (1980): “On strategy-proofness and single peakedness,” Public Choice, 35, 437–455.
PEREMANS, W. AND T. STORCKEN (1999): “Strategy-proofness on single-dipped preference
domains,” in Proceedings of the International Conference, Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice,
296–313.
PETERS, H., S. ROY, S. SADHUKHAN, AND T. STORCKEN (2017): “An extreme point character-
ization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains,”
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 69, 84–90.
PETERS, H., S. ROY, A. SEN, AND T. STORCKEN (2014): “Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over
single-peaked domains,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 52, 123–127.
ROBERTS, K. W. (1977): “Voting over income tax schedules,” Journal of public Economics, 8, 329–340.
ROMER, T. (1975): “Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear income tax,”
Journal of Public Economics, 4, 163–185.
SAPORITI, A. (2009): “Strategy-proofness and single-crossing,” Theoretical Economics, 4, 127–163.
——— (2014): “Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents,” Journal
of Economic Theory, 154, 216–228.
SATTERTHWAITE, M. A. (1975): “Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: Existence and corre-
spondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions,” Journal of economic
theory, 10, 187–217.
SEN, A. (2011): “The Gibbard random dictatorship theorem: a generalization and a new proof,”
SERIEs, 2, 515–527.
37
WESTHOFF, F. (1977): “Existence of equilibria in economies with a local public good,” Journal of
economic Theory, 14, 84–112.
WEYMARK, J. A. (2011): “A unified approach to strategy-proofness for single-peaked preferences,”
SERIEs, 2, 529–550.
38
